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MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REVIEW PANELS IN
OPERATION IN VIRGINIA
William H. Daughtrey, Jr.*
Charles H. Smith**
I. INTRODUCTION
The last major revision of Virginia statutes relating to medical
malpractice was in 1976. At that time the General Assembly pro-
vided for medical malpractice review panels1 and mandated a
method of reporting medical malpractice claims.2 These innova-
tions were in response to a perceived medical malpractice crisis in
the mid-1970's 3 A symptom of the crisis was the astronomical rise
in the cost of medical malpractice insurance premiums.4 This in-
crease plagued patients as well as physicians, hospitals, and other
health care providers.5 The higher premiums, of course, were re-
flected in fees for services rendered by providers. In addition, prov-
* Associate Professor of Business Administration and Management, Virginia Common-
wealth University; Member of Virginia and American Bar; Executive Director, Mid-Atlantic
Regional Business Law Association; B.S., 1955, Hampden-Sydney College; J.D., 1958, T. C.
Williams School of Law, University of Richmond.
** Assistant Professor of Management Science, Virginia Commonwealth University;
A.M., 1971, University of Michigan; Ph.D., Mathematics, 1975, University of Maryland;
M.B.A., 1981, College of William and Mary.
1. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-581.1 to .20 (Repl. Vol. 1984). Panels are provided for in the
first ten sections; other sections allow civil immunity for certain providers, establish mone-
tary limitation on recovery in certain malpractice actions, and define standard of care.
2. See id. § 38.1-389.3 (Repl. Vol. 1981), repealed by 1982 Va. Acts ch. 229.
3. DiAntonio v. Northampton-Accomack Mem. Hosp., 628 F.2d 287, 290 (4th Cir. 1980).
The Fourth Circuit noted the following with respect to the legislative intent of the Act:
There was a legislative finding that the high cost of medical malpractice insurance
was beyond the means of some health care providers and that they were ceasing to
render services. It was thought that the passage of the Act would lower the cost of
medical malpractice insurance since the panel would weed out the frivolous claims
and would perform a mediation function with respect to other claims. In consequence
of the panel's performance of these functions, it was believed that the amount of
medical malpractice litigation would be substantially reduced, thus substantially low-
ering the cost of medical malpractice insurance.
Id.
4. Lipman, Huge Malpractice Suits, Premiums Threaten Insurers and Health Care,
Wall St. J., Sept. 21, 1983, § 2, at 35, col. 4.
5. Id.
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iders began to practice "defensive medicine."'6 Upon learning of
huge, well publicized verdicts against at least a few of their breth-
ren, they defensively ordered costly medical and laboratory tests
and examinations to avoid the possible inference of laxity and cul-
pability.7 These procedures added to the patient's bill.'
Virginia's response to the national phenomenon included a Med-
ical Malpractice Act,9 which established the panel system, and sep-
arate legislation for the collection of certain data on medical mal-
practice claims.10 The perceived intent of the panel statute was to
eliminate litigation of a significant number of medical malpractice
disputes.11 The express purpose of the data-collection statute was
to obtain information in order to review the reasonableness of mal-
practice insurance premium rates. 2
The panel legislation, before long, will have been in effect for a
decade. However, the reporting statute was repealed in 198213 since
it never provided useful information.14 It is now time to evaluate
the panel system and to consider enactment of a data collection
statute that will result in conclusions as to the efficacy of medical
malpractice review panels in discouraging expensive and unneces-
sary litigation. In 1984, the General Assembly instituted its own
investigation into the possible need for a major revision of the laws
relating to panels, data collection, and other areas affecting claims
of malpractice.'"
This article focuses briefly on the panels in operation based
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-581.1 to .20 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
10. Id. § 38.1-389.3 (Repl. Vol. 1981), repealed by 1982 Va. Acts ch. 229.
11. Diversion in Virginia and other states of medical malpractice claims from the court
system is distinguished by the fact that this action was taken not in response to problems of
court congestion, but to escalating liability insurance premiums. See P. EBNEz, COURT EF-
FORTS TO REDUCE PRETRIAL DELAY: A NATIONAL INVENTORY XV-XVi (1981).
12. VA. CODE ANN. § 238.1-389.3.C (Repl. Vol. 1981), repealed by 1982 Va. Acts ch. 229.
13. 1982 Va. Acts ch. 228, at 370-78.
14. 1981 data study conducted by Virginia Bureau of Insurance (study furnished in letter
from R. Rollins, Bureau of Insurance to Virginia Division of Legal Services (July 27, 1983))
(study recommended repeal of section 38.1-389.3 given inherent inadequacies of the data
base developed and the availability of superior information sources).
15. See H.J.R. 20, 1st Reg. Sess., 1984 Va. Acts (requesting the House Committee of Jus-
tice and the Senate Committee for Courts to establish a joint subcommittee to study the
medical malpractice laws of the Commonwealth); H.J.R. 25, 1st Sess., 1984 Va. Acts (re-
questing a joint committee of the House and Senate Courts of Justice Committees to study
the question of the continued need for Medical Review Panels).
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upon data covering their first eight years of existence."6 It is hoped
that the article will enlighten lawyers who have never handled a
medical malpractice claim, provide some interesting data for those
who have, and suggest some changes in the law in the public inter-
est in order to be more certain that the panel system helps contain
costs in the disposition of medical malpractice claims. The data
and suggestions will follow a short explanation of the panel statute.
II. FRAMEWORK OF THE ACT
The Virginia Medical Malpractice Act 7 provides for screening
panels designed to keep both meritorious and frivolous claims out
of the court system. A major goal of the legislation is to help con-
tain the cost of medical malpractice insurance by encouraging com-
promise settlements and abandonments of nonmeritorious claims.' 8
Lower premiums logically follow avoidance of litigation. In turn,
the cost containment of premiums will be reflected in what pa-
tients must pay for medical services.
Since the advent of the innovative Medical Malpractice Review
Panels (panels) on July 1, 1976, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court of Virginia has appointed over 900 panels involving claims
against over 1,800 health care providers."9 On the average, each
panel renders opinions involving two prospective defendants. 0 Ap-
proximately 2,700 practicing attorneys and the same number of
health care providers have served as panelists, some individuals
serving as panelists more than once.
The framework for the operation of panels is uncomplicated.
The Act provides that no action may be brought against a health
care provider (provider) unless the claimant first notifies the pro-
vider, in writing, of the claim prior to the institution of suit.2 '
16. The data we processed were available in raw form through the office of the Executive
Secretary of the Virginia Supreme Court. Various participants in the panel process must
provide data as required by the Medical Malpractice Rules of Practice promulgated by the
Chief Justice. See MEDICAL MALPRACrICE R. 1-7, reprinted in 11 VA. CODE ANN. at 295-302
(Repl. Vol. 1984).
17. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-581.1 to .20 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
18. See DiAntonio v. Northampton-Accomack Mem. Hosp., 628 F.2d 287, 290 (4th Cir.
1980).
19. See supra note 16.
20. Id.
21. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.2A (Repl. Vol. 1984) (provides that the notification include
the time of the alleged malpractice with a reasonable description of the act or acts of mal-
practice and further provides that the claimant or the provider may file a written request
1985]
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Within sixty days of such notice, either the provider, the claimant,
or both of them may request that the Chief Justice appoint a panel
to review the case.22 Upon this request by either party, appoint-
ment of a panel is mandatory.2 s
At the direction of the Chief Justice, the claim is then forwarded
to a panel chairman. The chairman must be either a sitting or a
retired circuit court judge in the geographic area in which the
cause of action arose.24 Six other panelists, including three impar-
tial health care providers, licensed and actively practicing their
professions in Virginia,25 are selected by lists furnished by the Vir-
ginia State Bar and the State Board of Medicine, respectively.
26
"Impartial" was defined by a 1981 amendment to the Act,2 7 gener-
ally in response to the hesitance of some individuals to serve as
panelists, not because of allegations of bias on the part of individ-
ual panelists. Certain business or professional relationships be-
tween a panelist and one of the parties or his family or business
associates preclude service as a panelist.
28
The panel process affords both claimants and providers the op-
portunity for full presentation of their respective positions. The
testimony of expert witnesses is offered in over fifty percent of the
panel presentations.2 9 Other evidence includes medical charts, X-
rays, laboratory tests, excerpts of treatises, and depositions, as well
for panel review within 60 days of such notification).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. § 8.01-581.3 (provides for the composition of the panel, addresses the circum-
stances under which the chairman shall have a vote and directs that non-judge panelists
shall be sworn by the chairman to render an opinion faithfully and fairly).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. § 8.01-581.1(7)-(8) (provides more specifically that the attorney-panelist shall not
have represented either the claimant, his family, his partners, co-proprietors or his other
business interests; nor the provider, his family his partners, his co-proprietors or his other
business interests. The provider-panelist shall not have actually examined or treated or an-
ticipate examination or treatment of the claimant or his family; nor shall such panelist be
an employee, partner or co-proprietor of the prospective defendant.).
29. We conducted an independent mail survey during summer 1984 of the 117 Virginia
circuit court judges sitting as of Jan. 1 of that year to inquire as to certain aspects of panel
operations. Of the sixty judges responding who had chaired panels, 35% had heard testi-
mony of expert witnesses at all panel hearings, 51% at most hearings, and 5% at none of
the hearings; 8% did not respond to the question about proffer of expert testimony at the
panel level. W. Daughtrey & C. Smith, Medical Malpractice Review Panel Questionnaire
(Jan. 1, 1984) (canvassing Virginia Circuit Court judges) (available at University of Rich-
mond Law Library).
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as oral testimony of witnesses.30 Since 1979, both parties have the
right to an ore tenus hearing;31 in the same year, it was made clear
by statutory amendment that depositions of witnesses, including
the parties, are permitted at the discretion of the chairman. 32 Ac-
cording to the judges who have chaired panels, depositions are
commonly used at the panel level; sixty-three percent of the judges
reported that depositions were routine,33 twenty-three percent of
the judges reported that depositions were taken at least once dur-
ing each panel.34 Indeed, the law encourages thorough preparation
for presentations to the panel. In particular, the statute provides
that the panel's written opinion is admissible as evidence in any
subsequent action.3 5 Unless one is satisfied that an unfavorable
opinion will not harm his case before the jury, he must prepare for
the panel as diligently as he would for trial.
Remembering that the panel system is designed to provide an
expeditious resolution of disputes between claimants and provid-
ers, the General Assembly in 1981 specified that the opinion shall
be rendered no later than six months from the designation of the
panel unless extraordinary circumstances warrant chairmen grant-
ing an extension not to exceed ninty days.3" If an opinion is not
rendered within the time allowed, the claimant is free to institute
suit.37 Also, any late opinion is inadmissible as evidence unless the
delay was caused by the claimant.3
Attorneys and their clients apparently found that the six-month
time constraint did not allow adequate time to prepare in all in-
stances. While there is no recorded legislative history to cite, it is
30. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.4 (Repl. Vol. 1984) (comprehensive and obviously designed
to allow for thorough preparation prior to presentation at the panel hearing).
31. Id. § 8.01-581.5 (also requires notice to the parties by adequate means to assure their
presence at the time and place of the hearing).
32. Id. § 8.01-581.4 (provides that the chairman shall rule on the admissibility of all or
any part of a deposition offered as evidence at the hearing).
33. See supra note 29.
34. Id.
35. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.8 (RepL VoL 1984) (grants either party the right to call at
his cost any non-judge member of the panel as a witness in any action subsequently
brought. Although the reason(s) for this right are unstated, the trier of fact in the subse-
quent action can know the basis for the panel opinion if panelist(s) are called by any party.).
36. Id. § 8.01-581.7:1 (must be read with recently amended section 8.01-581.3 (Repl. VoL
1984) providing as of July 1, 1984, the six months shall begin to run only upon certification
by the parties that discovery has been completed and all relevant documents and state-
ments have been submitted).
37. Id.
38. Id.
19851
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suggested that this time constraint, at least in part,39 led to the
1984 amendment which delays designation of the attorney and the
health care panelists (i.e., the full panel) until certification of the
parties that discovery has been completed and that all relevant
documents and statements have been submitted.40 Formerly, all
panelists were appointed soon after the Chief Justice received the
request for panel treatment. Since the clock does not begin to run
until after the designation of the full panel, there is considerably
more time now for discovery and other pre-panel preparations
than there was before the 1984 amendment. Oddly, the current
statute appears to place no limit on the amount of time that may
lapse between the request for a panel and certification of the par-
ties that they are ready for the hearing. By analogy, Virginia pro-
cedural law allows a court, in its limited discretion, to discontinue
certain actions under certain circumstances which have been dock-
eted for more than two years and to dismiss them after five.4'
Given this analogy, however, even a two year delay appears incon-
sistent with the goal of speed in the resolution of claims at the
panel level.
Panel opinions, when rendered, address two of the elements that
a claimant must prove to obtain a judgment against a provider:
(1) malpractice, usually involving allegations that the provider
failed to comply with the appropriate standard of care, but also
may include intentional torts and (2) proximate cause.42 Each pan-
elist, except for the chairman, selects one of four legislatively man-
dated opinions.43 In brief, the opinion must be that the evidence:
(1) does not support the allegations of malpractice;
(2) does support allegations of both malpractice and proximate
cause;
(3) does support allegations of malpractice, but does not support
39. Another justification for the amendment is that there is no need to appoint attorney
and provider panelists and to schedule a hearing until after the parties certify that discov-
ery has been completed and that all relevant documents and statements have been provided
for distribution to the panelists. The certification of completion is a strong indication that
the panelists must meet as a group and that the date for the meeting will not be changed
after it has been set. This consideration for panelists should help minimize reluctance to
serve for what is essentially pro bono work.
40. VP. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.3 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
41. Id. § 8.01-335.
42. Id. § 8.01-581.7.A. Interestingly, this is the only section relating to panels which has
not been amended or repealed since 1976.
43. Id.
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the proximate cause element; or
(4) reveals a material issue of fact, not requiring an expert opin-
ion, but rather an issue which deserves consideration by a judge or
jury.44
One cannot say with certainty when the fourth opinion is appro-
priate. Perhaps the legislature included it to blunt a constitutional
challenge based on the argument that panels deny access to the
courts. However, the statute would be constitutional without this
choice, since "the jury is free to accept or reject the conclusion of
the panel majority in light of all of the evidence [subsequently]
brought before it. '' 45 One trial lawyer writes that the issue-of-fact
opinion "covers the situation where the case involves a 'swearing
contest,' wherein the claimant states that HCP [health care pro-
vider] did or did not do a certain thing, and the HCP disputes the
contention. '46 Whatever the fourth type of opinion covers, it has
been selected by panels in only thirty-five of 1,351 instances of al-
leged medical malpractice brought before them.47
When one of these four choices receives at least a majority vote,
that choice is the opinion of the panel.48 The chairman votes only
in the case of a tie.49 The opinion must be in writing and signed by
all panelists who agree with it.5° A non-concurring panelist may
note his dissent.51 Most chairmen furnish a typewritten opinion
sheet allowing each panelist to note the specific choice which the
panelist deems appropriate at the conclusion of the deliberations,
although the statute does not prescribe any particular form for the
required writing.
Ideally the written opinion will result in a compromise settle-
ment or-the abandonment of a non-meritorious claim. However,
the panel's opinion is binding upon no one.5 2
44. Id.
45. DiAntonio v. Northampton-Accomack Mem. Hosp., 628 F.2d 287, 291 (4th Cir. 1980).
46. Harlan, Virginia's New Medical Malpractice Review Panel and Some Questions It
Raises, 11 U. RiCH. L. REv. 51, 56 (1976).
47. See supra note 1; see also Table 4, infra note 116.
48. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.6(5) (Repl. Vol. 1984).
49. Id. § 8.01-581.3(ii).
50. Id. § 8.01-581.7C (provides also that all opinions shall be mailed to claimant and pro-
vider within five days of the date of their rendering).
51. Id.
52. DiAntonio v. Northampton-Accomack Mem. Hosp., 628 F.2d 287, 292 (4th Cir. 1980).
1985] 279
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III. VIEWS OF OTHERS
The panel law received attention soon after its enactment in
three articles: Virginia's New Medical Malpractice Review Panel
and Some Questions it Raises,53 A Guide to Medical Malpractice
in Virginia,54 and Virginia's Medical Malpractice Act: A Constitu-
tional Analysis,55 appearing respectively in 1976, 1979 and 1980.
The first two articles are written by trial attorneys. The third arti-
cle is written by a law student. All three offer theoretical insight
into the operation of the panel system. They outline the screening
process and raise questions. However, these questions can only be
answered when there is enough data to truly evaluate the efficiency
of the panel system in practice.
The earliest article, Virginia's New Medical Malpractice Review
Panel, pessimistically concludes that the worth of the panel legis-
lation "is inversely proportional to the haste with which it was
'drafted and enacted. ' 56 The author's concerns arise mainly from
the provisions allowing the opinion to be introduced at trial al-
though "(1) the rules of evidence need not be observed [at the
panel hearing] and (2) a [mere] majority of the panel may render
an opinion. '5 7 The author also expressed the view that the Virginia
Medical Malpractice Act may be unconstitutional. 8
The two later articles are more optimistic about the panels. One
article concludes that "since the panel procedure provides a more
informed basis for the screening of medical malpractice cases than
heretofore available, and in a speedier and less expensive manner,
it is anticipated that an overwhelming majority of future medical
malpractice claims will be handled by panel review."59 The Com-
ment, also optimistic for the future of panels, predicted correctly
that a court might well sustain the Act against separation of pow-
ers, equal protection, and due process challenges.60
The concerns expressed by the authors regarding the constitu-
tionality of the Act were addressed in DiAntonio v. Northampton-
53. See Harlan, supra note 46.
54. Scott, A Guide to Medical Malpractice in Virginia, 5, No. 1 VA. BA.AJ. 5 (1979).
55. Comment, Virginia's Medical Malpractice Act: A Constitutional Analysis, 37 WASEL
& LEE L. REv. 1192 (1980).
56. See Harlan, supra note 46, at 68.
57. Id. at 56.
58. Id. at 60.
59. See Scott, supra note 54, at 22.
60. See Comment, supra note 55, at 1205.
280 [Vol. 19:273
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Accomack Memorial Hospital." In DiAntonio, the plaintiff sued
the defendant health care providers in federal court in an attempt
to avoid the notice-of-claim requirements of the Virginia law, and
indeed to avoid the screening process completely. The U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected constitutional challenges
to the Virginia notice-of-claim requirements which were based
upon separation of powers, equal protection, and due process. The
plaintiff was required to comply with the Virgmiia Medical Mal-
practice Act. The court accepted the legislative finding that "the
high cost of medical malpractice insurance was beyond the means
of some health care providers and that they were ceasing to render
services. . .[and that] it was believed that the amount of medical
malpractice litigation would be substantially reduced, thus sub-
stantially lowering the cost of medical malpractice insurance. "62
The theoretical underpinning of the Virginia panel statutes are
supported by DiAntonio and two of the three commentators who
discussed the statute. No one, however, has considered whether the
legislative goals of speed and cost-containment have been realized
in practice. Have the now 900 panels resulted in a substantial re-
duction of litigation and the attendant substantial reduction of the
cost of medical malpractice insurance premiums? Do panels
shorten or lengthen the time between the making of a claim and its
resolution? Or are panels simply a neutral factor in the length of
dispute resolution without any cost savings to claimants, providers
and insurance carriers, but nevertheless taking the time of court
system personnel and the panelists: judges, practicing attorneys
and health care providers? These are difficult rhetorical questions
and answering them is a formidably technical task. Such answers
are accurate only to the extent necessary data is available and col-
lectible. These questions need to be addressed now that the panel
mechanism has operated for almost a decade.
While we do not have all of the answers, we have collected avail-
able data revealing some of the aspects of panels in operation from
July 1, 1976 through June 30, 1983. Before presenting these data
however, the efforts of other states to reduce the number of medi-
cal malpractice suits is noted.
61. 628 F.2d 287 (4th Cir. 1980).
62. Id. at 290 (emphasis added).
1985]
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IV. EFFORTS IN OTHER STATES
Two recent Rand Reports are instructive in identifying the vari-
ety of panel authorizations from state to state.6 3 These Reports
taken together not only reveal the lack of uniformity of systems
among the thirty states which authorized panels, but also reveal
that panel systems are no longer operational in six of these states.
Since the Rand Reports, two additional states, Nevada 4 and
Rhode Island,65 abolished screening mechanisms. No state has en-
acted new panel legislation since 1978, although existing statutes
continue to be amended."'
One of the Rand Reports criticizes the panel systems instituted
nationwide because the systems did not provide for data collection
to determine their effectiveness.
Screening panels were generally established without any provision
for evaluation, and perhaps as a result, statistical data on the opera-
tion of panels and their impact on the settlement of cases are not
collected in many states and are incomplete in most others. Al-
though the variation in procedures provides a good opportunity for
evaluating the effects of a number of factors, no such comparative
analysis has been conducted. Nor has there been an empirical evalu-
ation of the panels' effects on medical liability insurance
premiums.6 7
Variations among the states make it difficult to determine by
comparisons which particular provisions best balance the conflict-
ing interests of claimants and providers. Variables to be manipu-
lated in drafting or amending an act include:
(1) Time of assignment of the claim to a panel-whether before
or after suit is filed;6e
63. See P. DANZON, THE FREQUENCY AND SEVERITY OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS, R-
2870 ICJ/HCFA, prepared for the Institute for Civil Justice, Rand Corp. 43-45 (1982). See
also P. EBNER, supra note 11, at 56-68.
64. See Lipman, supra note 4.
65. RI. GEN. LAWS §§ 10-19-1 to -7 (1976) (repealed in 1983 in its entirety by ch. 19, Tit.
10 of the Laws of Rhode Island); see also Boucher v. Sayeed, - R.I. - 459 A.2d 87 (1983)
(declaring the statute unconstitutional on equal protection grounds in that no rational basis
exists to support the distinction between medical malpractice claimants and tort plaintiffs
as a whole).
66. See P. EBNER, supra note 11, at 58.
67. Id. at 68.
68. For the time of assignment of the claim to a panel in Virginia, see supra text accom-
282 [Vol. 19:273
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(2) The size and composition of the panel; also, compensation
of, and immunity from suit for, the panelists; 9
(3) Time constraints on panel consideration;70
(4) The admissibility of evidence and the degree of formality re-
quired in the panel's deliberations;71
(5) The scope of the panel's findings, i.e., failure to comply with
the appropriate standard of care, proximate cause and/or dam-
ages; 72 and
(6) The admissibility and weight of the panel's opinion at trial
when litigation follows. 7
3
The variations must, of course, always be considered in light of
equal protection, due process, separation of powers, and other state
and federal constitutional requirements.
Considering the conflicting interests of claimants and providers,
and the numerous variations in design of panel systems, it is not
surprising that the constitutionality of many of the disparate stat-
utes have been challenged in the courts. By 1979, ten states had
upheld the constitutionality of their panel system.7 4 Some of the
screening mechanisms, however, have not withstood constitutional
attack. The Illinois statute constituted an impermissible restriction
panying notes 22-36.
69. See supra text accompanying notes 25-26. In Virginia, the panel is composed of a
judge chairman, 3 lawyers and 3 providers. Effective July 1, 1984, each panelist receives
$50-up from $25-per diem plus actual and necessary expenses. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-
581.10 (Repl. Vol. 1984). Panelists have absolute immunity from civil liability for all com-
munications, findings, opinions, and conclusions in the course and scope of their panel du-
ties. See id. § 8.01-581.8.
70. There is some uncertainty as to the time constraints imposed by Virginia's panel sys-
tem. See supra text accompanying notes 36-41.
71. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.6 (Repl. Vol. 1984) (provides, in part, that it is not
necessary to follow the rules of evidence). But see supra note 35 and accompanying text
(discussing the power of the panel chairmen to rule on the admissibility of all or any part of
a deposition).
72. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.7(A)-(B) (Repl. Vol 1984); see also supra text accompa-
nying note 42.
73. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.8 (Repl. Vol. 1984). (panel's opinion is not conclusive);
see also DiAntonio v. Northampton-Accomack Mem. Hosp., 628 F.2d 287, 292 (4th Cir.
1980) (panel's opinion is binding on no one).
74. New York, Florida (later declared unconstitutional in practice), Nebraska, Arizona,
Idaho, Louisiana, Maryland, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania (later declared unconstitutional in
practice) and Indiana as listed in Hines v. Elkhart Gen. Hosp., 465 F. Supp. 421, 434 (N.D.
Ind.), af'd, 603 F.2d 646 (7th Cir. 1979). Virginia's panel system was held constitutional in
1980 in DiAntonio. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
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on the right of trial by jury guaranteed by the state constitution."
The North Dakota statute providing for the total abolition of trial
by jury was also declared unconstitutional.7 6 The Missouri Profes-
sional Liability Review Board was declared unconstitutional on the
ground that it denied access to the courts. The New Hampshire
and Rhode Island courts struck down the screening system as a
denial of equal protection in view of potential litigational advan-
tages of one class of tort defendants over another.78 As noted ear-
lier, the legislatures of Rhode Island and Nevada repealed their
review panel statutes.79 The repeal in Rhode Island was a response
to the court decision declaring it unconstitutional."0
Although several panel statutes failed because they violated con-
stitutional rights, most of the thirty statutes were drafted to with-
stand constitutional challenges. Recently, however, panel systems
have been subject to a new attack; claims are now being made that
the panel systems in their operation rather than in theory violate
constitutional rights. This approach has been successful in two
states.
In 1976, in Carter v. Sparkmen,81 the Florida Medical Mediation
Act was declared constitutional. Respondents in Carter unsuccess-
fully argued that the Act was facially invalid because it denied
equal protection, was arbitrary and capricious, and effectively insu-
lated medical personnel from legal accountability. Four years later,
in Aldana v. Holubs2 the same statute was again challenged. This
time, however, the court declared the statute unconstitutional, rec-
ognizing that "[w]hat was originally contemplated as an inexpen-
sive summary procedure would now extend to twelve, fourteen, or
possibly even sixteen months or more, thereby effectively denying
one's access to the courts."83
The facts in Aldana, actually two cases consolidated upon ap-
75. Wright v. Central Dupage Hosp. Ass'n, 63 M. 2d 313, _, 347 N.E.2d 736, 739-41
(1976).
76. Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 135 (N.D. 1978).
77. State ex rel. Cardinal Glennon Mem. Hosp. v. Gaertner, 583 S.W.2d 107, 110 (Mo.
1979).
78. P. DANZON, supra note 63, at 43. The Rhode Island case striking down the panel stat-
ute is Boucher v. Sayeed, - R.I. -, 459 A.2d 87 (1983).
79. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
80. Id.
81. 335 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 1976).
82. 381 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1980).
83. Id. at 238.
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peal, 4 are worthy of note. Under Florida's law, the jurisdiction of
the panel terminated ten months from the time the injured party
filed a statement of claim with the clerk of the trial court.85 In
Aldana, the misconduct of a panelist required a "mistrial." Be-
cause of the court's crowded calendar, the hearing could not be
rescheduled to within the ten month period.
In the second of the two cases decided in Aldana, Abel v. Kirch-
gessner, the judicial referee set the hearing within the ten months
allowed, but allotted only one-half hour for the hearing. The open-
ing statements were made on the appointed day. However, the
matter was continued to another date which was seven days be-
yond the expiration of the ten-month period. 6 These facts, cou-
pled with a "painstaking examination of over seventy [other] cases
cited to us ... and those of which we take judicial notice...,
led the Florida Supreme Court to declare the panel statute uncon-
stitutional in its operations; the statute was "unconstitutional in
its entirety as violative of the due process clauses of the United
States and Florida Constitutions."88
The justices in Aldana were unanimous in their belief that there
had been a denial of the doctors' due process rights in losing the
opportunity for panel consideration. However, one justice, dissent-
ing in part, would not have struck down the entire statute. He
would limit the decision to the two cases before the court.89 While
judicial restraint is usually admirable, a case by case analysis
would have substantially increased the amount of litigation in
Florida. The dissent noted that "there probably have been
thousands of mediation cases throughout this state where the juris-
dictional time period has not run and neither the claimants nor the
doctors have been deprived of any constitutional rights."90 Unfor-
tunately, there was no data to support this statement.
Less than one year after the Florida decision, the Pennsylvania
Health Care Services Malpractice Act was also declared unconsti-
84. The cases were Aldana, and Abel v. Kirchgessner. See id at 231.
85. The court found no reasonable basis for it to save the constitutionality of the statute
by inferring legislative permission to extend the ten month period-to do so would tran-
scend the outer limits of constitutional tolerance. Aldana, 381 So. 2d at 237-38.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 238.
89. Id. at 239.
90. Id.
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tutional. In Mattos v. Thompson91 the Pennsylvania panels were
found to have failed in their goal of expeditious resolution of medi-
cal malpractice claims, resulting in an impermissible infringement
upon the right to a jury trial guaranteed in the Pennsylvania
constitution.
Two years before Mattos, the Pennsylvania court had found its
screening system constitutional "on the theoretical plane."9 2 Data
on claims filed between April 6, 1976 and May 31, 1980 demon-
strated to a majority of the Mattos court, however, that delays in
processing claims under the Pennsylvania version of screening
panels resulted in oppressive delay and impermissibly infringed
upon the right to a jury.9 3 The majority opinion includes and relies
upon data collected during this period; the data revealed that of
the total 3,452 cases filed with the panel Administrator only 936
had been resolved, settled or terminated. Seventy-three percent of
the cases filed had not been resolved.9 4
Many other statistics are cited in the opinion, including the av-
erage time between filing a certificate of readiness for panel consid-
eration and the appointment of a panel chairperson: 7.57 months.95
The opinion is noteworthy because it is based on statistical analy-
sis of the performance of the Pennsylvania panel system in opera-
tion over a period of years.
One justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part, indicated
that he would have found the Pennsylvania statute unconstitu-
tional on its face earlier, and he would do so again.96 Another jus-
tice, in dissent, concluded that the Pennsylvania statute was con-
stitutional both in theory and in practice.97 He noted that the
legislature attempted in 1979 to improve the Act by decreasing the
size of the panel from seven members to three and by requiring
certificates of readiness to be filed within one year of the date of
initiation of the action.9 8 Further, the dissenting opinion predicted
that the amendment would insure litigants a panel hearing within
91. 491 Pa. 385, 421 A.2d 190 (1980).
92. Parker v. Children's Hosp. of Philadelphia, 483 Pa. 106, -, 394 A.2d 932, 942-43
(1978).
93. Mattos, 491 Pa. at -, 421 A.2d at 194-96.
94. Id. at -' 421 A.2d at 194.
95. Id.
96. Id. at -' 421 A.2d at 196-97 (Larsen, J., concurring and dissenting).
97. Id. at -, 421 A.2d at 197-99 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at -, 421 A.2d at 198-99.
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fifteen months of initiation of an action.99
Is the Virginia panel statute constitutional in practice? In no re-
ported case has the issue been addressed. As illustrated in Mattos,
statistical analysis of the performance of a panel system may be
used in constitutionally challenging or defending a statute. The
following section summarizes available data regarding Virginia's
panel statute.
V. VIRGINIA DATA SUMMARY
During the period of study, in the first eight years of panel exis-
tence, 874 cases were opened.100 During the first few years of the
panel system, the annual number of requests for panels was er-
ratic. For example, eighty-seven cases were opened during the first
year of panel operation (July 1, 1976 - June 30, 1977), but only
forty-three were opened during the second year. 10' Since July 1,
1979, however, there has been steady growth in the number of
panels appointed each year. These periods have shown a com-
pound growth rate of twenty percent. One hundred seventy-eight
cases were opened during the 1983-84 panel year. 0 2 If the recent
growth trend continues, approximately 215 cases could be opened
during the 1984-85 year.
The median time for a case, from receipt of panel request to is-
suance of the opinion of the panel or withdrawal from panel con-
99. Id. at - 421 A.2d at 199.
100.
TABLE 1
NUMBER OF PANELS REQUESTED PER MMRP YEAR
Period Opened Still Open
1 (1976-77) 87 0
2 (1977-78) 43 0
3 (1978-79) 101 2
4 (1979-80) 86 4
5 (1980-81) 110 3
6 (1981-82) 128 8
7 (1982-83) 141 11
SUBTOTAL 696 TOTAL 28
8 (1983-84) 178 (Data not available
for period 8)
101. Id.
102. Id.
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sideration, is 245 days, or slightly over eight months.1 03 When me-
dian time is calculated on the basis of prospective defendants
(rather than by panels) the time consumed by panel consideration
is also just over eight months.10 4 Following the 1979 amendments,
which allow ore tenus hearings as a matter of right and discovery
depositions in the discretion of the chairman, one might have ex-
pected a substantial increase in the time consumed by panel con-
sideration of a case. In the first year under the amendments, the
duration of panel consideration (280 days) was significantly longer
than in the three preceding years which had medians of 240, 251
and 238 days.10 5
The 1981 legislation which imposed a six month time constraint
between a panel request and opinion was presumably intended -to
expedite panel consideration of claims. 06 Not surprisingly, the
shortest median performance for resolution of claims occurred dur-
ing the 1982-83 panel year, the first year following the 1981
amendment. During that year, the median time for a case to be
open was 209 days. 07
New rules, which took effect in July, 1984, seem to loosen con-
siderably the time restrictions on the process since the panel need
not be designated until certification by the parties that discovery is
complete. 0 8 While data has not yet been generated which will per-
mit an evaluation of the effect of this 1984 change, the median
times established in prior years will serve as a benchmark to deter-
mine the desirability of increased time for discovery and other ac-
TABLE 2
AVERAGE TIME OPEN
No. of
Time Open
(Days)
Period Closed Cases Median Mean
1 (1976-77) 87 240 319
2 (1977-78) 43 251 305
3 (1978-79) 99 238 318
4 (1979-80) 82 280 350
5 (1980-81) 107 259 309
6 (1981-82) 120 251 283
7 (1982-83) 130 209 224
TOTAL: 668 OVERALL: 245 296 TO'
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See supra note 36 and acconipanying text.
107. See supra note 103.
108. See supra notes 39-41.
No. of
Providers
157
79
217
175
189
241
293
rAL: 1351
Time Open
(Days)
Median Mean
234 331
254 310
251 386
324 425
259 305
240 281
216 224
OVERALL: 248 315
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tivities in preparation for the panel hearing.
As of June 30, 1983, a total of 668 closed cases had been brought
before the panels, and 1,351 providers had been involved as pro-
spective defendants. 10 9 In approximately forty percent of the
panels, no opinion was rendered because of withdrawal, dismissal
of the panel request, or settlement. 1 0 Perhaps some of the claim-
ants' requests for a panel served as stimuli to compromise before
and after panel hearings. Also, perhaps some of the requests by
providers may have forced claimants to evaluate their positions
earlier than they would have in the absence of the panel mecha-
nism. Thoughtful evaluations of rather weak claims should lead to
prompt abandonment of the claims in almost all cases.
Approximately fifty percent of the providers were found by the
panels to be free of malpractice.1 However, it is more instructive
for some purposes to focus only on those situations where panels
rendered opinions-cases involving 826 of the 1,351 proposed de-
fendants. In these cases the panel found the providers guilty of
malpractice proximately causing the injury less than ten percent of
the time.112 Some data suggests that the panel decisions over-
whelmingly favored the provider regardless of which party re-
quested the panel. 3 More importantly, this data also suggests
that, in more than two-thirds of the claims, a panel decision in
favor of the defendant led to the abandonment of the claim with-
109. See supra note 103.
110.
TABLE 3
DISPOSITION SUMMARY
Type of Disposition Number of Providers % of Opinions
1. No malpractice ....................... 683 ............................... 82.7%
2. Malpractice and cause .............. 76 ................................ 9.2%
3. Malpractice, but not cause ........... 32 ................................ 3.9%
4. Issue of fact .......................... 35.......................... 4.2%
Subtotal 826
5. Withdrawn, dismissed or settled ........ 520
6. Unknown ............................. 5
Subtotal 525
Total 1351
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. The Virginia Medical Malpractice Review Panel-Present Status: Hearing of the Va.
Gen. Assembly's Joint Subcomm. Studying Virginia's Medical Malpractice Laws (Sept. 12,
1984) (remarks by K. Nelson) (available at Division of Legislative Services, General Assem-
bly Building, Richmond, Va.).
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out filing suit.114 Based on these figures, some may argue that
panel decisions too often favor providers to the detriment of claim-
ants, indicating a predisposition in favor of prospective defen-
dants-especially on the part of provider panelists. However, it
may also be argued that the panels are simply discouraging litiga-
tion of nonmeritorious claims. Moreover, by use of the panel sys-
tem, claimants are able to obtain an opinion without the testimony
of expert witnesses. Success at trial requires expert testimony in
most instances. 115
Approximately eighty-five percent of panel opinions have been
unanimous." 6 Analysis of data shows that there is a significantly
greater probability of an opinion favoring the provider when the
panel's decision is unanimous. 117 Only eight percent of the panel
opinions were against the provider when the vote was unani-
mous." 8 When the panel opinion was divided, about sixteen per-
cent of the opinions were against the provider." 9 One explanation
of these findings is that the panels unanimously find a proportion
of the claims nonmeritorious. However, another related explana-
tion may be that the claims favoring the claimants are inherently
more difficult and complex and are more likely to result in a lack
of panel unanimity.
The Virginia panel statute defines providers-as prospective de-
fendants-to include medical doctors (physicians), hospitals, den-
114. Id.
115. For requirements for expert testimony at trial and vagaries incident to such proffer,
see Maxwell v. McCaffrey, 219 Va. 909, 252 S.E.2d 342 (1979); Ives v. Redford, 219 Va. 838,
252 S.E.2d 315 (1979); Noll v. Rahal, 219 Va. 795, 250 S.E.2d 741 (1979); Little v. Cross, 217
Va. 71, 225 S.E.2d 387 (1976); Bly v. Rhoads, 216 Va. 645, 222 S.E.2d 783 (1976); Hunter v.
Burroughs, 123 Va. 113, 96 S.E. 360 (1918).
116.
TABLE 4
PANEL OPINION VIS-A-VIS STRENGTH OF
PANELISTS AGREEMENT
Panel Opinion No. Providers Unanimous Split
1. No malpractice 683 598 85
2. Malpractice and cause 76 55 21
3. Malpractice, but not cause 32 18 14
4. Issue of fact 35 23 12
TOTAL 826 (100%) 694 (84%) 132 (16%)
117. Id. (the relationship was statistically significant at the 0.005 level using the Chi-
square test for independence).
118. See supra note 116.
119. Id.
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tists, pharmacists, registered or licensed practical nurses, optome-
trists, podiatrists, chiropractors, physical therapists, physical-
therapist assistants, clinical psychologists, and certain nursing
homes. 120 The most likely prospective defendants, in decreasing or-
der of frequency, are medical doctors (a category excluding psychi-
atrists, opthalmologists, and pathologists), hospitals, dentists, pro-
fessional corporations, nurses, podiatrists, and psychiatrists. 121
These seven types of providers account for ninety percent of the
providers receiving panel consideration between July 1, 1976 and
June 30, 1983.122 The medical doctor category alone represents
fifty-five percent of the prospective defendants.123 When hospitals
are excluded, medical doctors represent two-thirds of the prospec-
tive defendants. The breakdown of panel findings according to the
type of provider who allegedly malpracticed has also been
120. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.1(1) (Repl. Vol. 1984).
121.
TABLE 5-A
PROSPECTIVE DEFENDANT FREQUENCIES
Type
Medical Doctors
Hospitals
Dentists
Professional Corporations
Nurses - RN and LPN
Podiatrists
Psychiatrists
All Other
Number
738
248
113
70
59
20
15
88
TOTAL 1351
Percentages
54.6%
18.4
8.4
5.2
4.4
1.5
1.1
6.5
100.0
TABLE 5-B
PROVIDER TYPES VIS-A-VIS CERTAIN DISPOSITIONS
Medical Doctors
Hospitals
Dentists
Professional
Corporations
Nurses - RN and
LPN
Podiatrists
Psychiatrists
122. Id.
123. Id.
Malpractice No Malpractice
48 400
9 132
8 44
6 37
1
TOTAL 72
No opinion;
Withdrawn
Malpractice Issue of Dismissed or
not Cause Fact Settled Tota
23 13 254 738
5 5 97 248
2 3 56 113
2 0 25 70
0 1 30 59
0 2
0 0
32 24
20
15
1263
d
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determined.1 2 4
Under the Virginia statute, provider panelists are to be selected
with due regard to "the nature of the claim and the nature of the
practice of the health care provider.' ' 25 Accordingly, the ap-
pointing authority designates at least one panelist who represents
the medical specialty involved in the claim. Therefore, the number
of times members of various specialties have served on the 668
closed panels, involving the appointment of approximately 2,000
provider panelists, also suggests the extent of involvement of these
specialties in medical malpractice claims. This information was
available with somewhat more detail concerning the medical spe-
cialty of the physician-patients than the prospective defendant
data cited above.' 26 The following seven specialties-in decreasing
order of frequency-account for about two-thirds of provider pan-
elists: general surgery, hospital administration, obstetrics-gynecol-
ogy, general practice, orthopedic surgery, internal medicine, and
dentistry. 2 7 These 2,000 professionals who served as panelists re-
ceived only $25 per day (now set at $50 per day) plus actual and
necessary expenses. 128
With regard to the legislative goal of the panel system, to pro-
vide for a speedy resolution of malpractice disputes by abandon-
ment of frivolous claims or by prompt payment of meritorious
claims, we focused on the average amount of time that a claim re-
ceives consideration at the panel level as a function of the ultimate
panel disposition (i.e., the time elapsed between panel request and
withdrawal, settlement/dismissal, or the rendition of a particular
124. Id.
125. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.3 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
126.
TABLE 6
SPECIALTIES MOST FREQUENTLY REPRESENTED
Specialty No. of Panelists
General Surgery 260
Hospital Administration 209
Obstetrics-Gynecology 200
General Practice 182
Orthopedic Surgery 166
Internal Medicine 166
Dentistry 156
127. Id.
128. See supra note 69.
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panel opinion). 129 Not surprisingly, cases expected to be more com-
plex and difficult (i.e., those cases involving the proximate cause
issue) tended to have the longest time open. Cases with a "No
Malpractice" opinion had a median time open of eight and one-
half months, about one month less than the cases with "Malprac-
tice" opinions. 130 Cases settled before a panel opinion was rendered
were open for a median of seven months after the panel request.131
On the average, each panel considers claims against two provid-
ers. The 668 closed panels included claims against 1,351 provid-
ers. 1 32 One particular panel considered claims against fifteen prov-
iders.1 33 One hundred thirty-nine panels had two prospective
defendants before them. It was thought that opinions would be less
favorable for claimants naming large numbers of prospective de-
fendants. This hypothesis, however, did not receive statistically
significant support from the findings on the seven-year period for
which data was collected.
129.
TABLE 7
TIME OPEN VIS-A-VIS TYPE DISPOSITION
Disposition No. of Median Mean
by Opinion of HCPs Days Days
1. No Malpractice 683 253 314
2. Malpractice 76 278 368
3. Malpractice, but not cause 32 289 385
4. Issue of fact 35 287 310
OVERALL 255 322
Withdrawn, settled or dismissed 525 206 304
TOTAL 1351 OVERALL 248 315
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133.
TABLE 8-A
NUMBER OF PROVIDERS PER CLOSED PANEL
No. of Providers No. of Providers No. of Providers
Panel Frequency Panel Frequency Panel Frequency
1 363 6 9 11 3
2 139 7 7 12 2
3 87 8 6 13 0
4 38 9 2 14 0
5 10 10 1 15 1
TOTAL 668
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:273
It appears from a mail survey of panel chairmen13 4 that the suc-
cess or failure of a panel depends heavily on the attitude of the
particular judge who chairs the panel. Many judges report that it is
difficult to schedule a hearing on a date convenient to the claim-
ant, the prospective defendant(s), their attorneys, and the six non-
judge panelists. Some judges are by nature more insistent than
others in encouraging prompt resolution at the panel level. Some
judges apparently equate the hearing to a mini-trial, necessitating
time for extensive preparation including procurement of expert
testimony. Other judges seem to view panels differently and insist
that six months is enough time for pre-hearing discovery in all in-
stances. One factor analyzed in panel performance was the rate
with which the claim advanced to a hearing and the panel ren-
dered an opinion. 135 The variations by locality for the median and
mean times for the handling of cases may reflect the predominant
attitude of the judges in a given area.' Cases in the Roanoke area,
for example, have shown a relatively rapid resolution. The median
time open in that locality is almost three months less than the me-
TABLE 8-B
DISPOSITIONS VIS-A-VIS SIZE OF PROVIDER GROUP
NUMBER OF PROVIDERS
Less than 5 Five or more TOTAL
1. No Malpractice 530 (39.2) 153 (11.3) 683 (50.6)
2. Malpractice 66 ( 4.9) 10 ( 0.7) 76 ( 5.6)
3. Malpractice, but not Cause 28 ( 2.1) 4 ( 0.3) 32 ( 2.4)
4. Issue of Fact 30 ( 2.2) 5 ( 0.4) 35 ( 2.6)
Withdrawn, settled or dismissed 398 (29.5) 127 ( 9.4) 525 (38.9)
TOTALS 1052 (77.9) 299 (22.1) 1351 (100.0)
(Percentages of the total are in parentheses)
134. See supra note 29.
135. Id.
136.
TABLE 9-A
TIME OPEN BY LOCALITY
Area* No. of Cases Median (Days) Mean (Days)
1. Charlottesville Area 23 221 285
2. Northern Virginia 157 236 277
3. Richmond Metro 90 245 296
4. Roanoke Metro 38 204 222
5. Tidewater Area 132 286 346
6. Southern Piedmont Area 40 246 263
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dian time open in the Tidewater area.137
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
The Virginia Medical Malpractice Act has provided a forum for
the screening of malpractice claims since 1976. The Act survived a
constitutional challenge in DiAntonio v. Northampton-Accomack
Memorial Hospital.1 38 In theory, the Virginia panel system does
not deny any party equal protection or right to a jury trial. Fur-
thermore, the Act does not violate similar provisions of the Vir-
ginia Constitution.
The General Assembly, originally and by subsequent amend-
ments, has made a diligent effort to design the panel system to
accommodate the various and conflicting interests of claimants and
prospective defendants. Amendments respond to the difficulty in-
herent in all panel systems of allowing enough time for a thorough
preparation for the panel presentation without unreasonable delay
in the final resolution of the malpractice dispute. From 1976 until
mid-1981, the legislature did not place any limit on the time that
could transpire between appointment of a panel and the rendition
of its opinion. After 1981, an opinion had to be rendered no later
than six months from the panel's appointment. An additional
ninety days may be granted by the chairman upon a showing of
extraordinary circumstances. This limitation was virtually aban-
TABLE 9-B
DISPOSITIONS BY LOCALITY
Disposition Charlotte- Richmond Roanoke Tide- Southern
by Opinion of ville No. Va. Metro Metro water Piedmont
1. No malpractice 13 (86.7%) 95 (83.3%) 46 (83.6%) 15 (83.3%) 45 (76.3%) 17 (65.4%)
2. Malpracitce 1 ( 6.7%) 9 ( 7.9%) 3 ( 5.5%) 3 (16.9%) 10 (16.9%) 5 (19.2%)
3. Malpractice, but
not cause 1 ( 6.7%) 5 (4.4%) 3 ( 5.5%) 0 ( 0%) 1 (1.7%) 1 ( 3.8%)
4. Issue of fact 0 (0%) 5 ( 4.4%) 3 ( 5.5%) 0 ( 0%) 3 ( 5.1%) 3 (11.5%)
TOTAL 15 114 55 18 59 26
Withdrawn, settled or
dismissed 8 43 35 20 73 14
137. Id. Another explanation for these dispositions may be suggested. It appears that the
median time and mean time for case resolution may be, in part, a function of the number of
claims filed. Analysis of the results, however, does not support this explanation. In Roanoke,
disputes were resolved noticeably quicker than in Charlottesville, where fewer cases were
filed and in Southern Piedmont, where approximately the same number of cases were
resolved.
138. 628 F.2d 287 (4th Cir. 1980). For a discussion of the case, see supra notes 61-62 and
accompanying text.
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doned in 1984 by the amendment providing that the six months
begin to run only after the parties certify that discovery has been
completed and all relevant documents have been submitted.
The data covering the period from 1976 to 1983 does not indi-
cate that the panel system causes any oppressive delay in the final
resolution of medical malpractice disputes. But care must be taken
to insure that it does not unreasonably prevent a timely disposi-
tion of claims in the future, especially now with the relaxation of
the time limit between the filing of a request for a panel and the
panel's opinion. One party may be before the panel involuntarily
and, therefore, may experience some unwanted delay prior to his
day in court.
This involuntary, unwanted delay, resulted in Florida and Penn-
sylvania declaring their panel laws unconstitutional in the actual
operations of the statutes. Panels must be designed and adminis-
tered around the competing risks involved in too long a delay and
too short a time in which to prepare adequately for the panel hear-
ing. Legislatures cannot rely on courts scrutinizing only the theo-
retical burdens placed on claimants or providers. Now there is an
additional concern: Does the time for actually processing claims in
a particular panel system result in an infringement of constitu-
tional rights? If a panel system takes too long to process claims,
parties may successfully argue that they are denied right to a jury.
If too short a time limit is put on panel consideration, parties may
successfully argue that they are denied due process. Therefore, an
acceptable time constraint must be of such duration that will allow
for adequate preparation and presentation to the panel.
Not only do legislatures and courts need to know how much time
a panel system takes to process a claim, they also need to know
how efficient the system is in preventing unnecessary and expen-
sive litigation. The DiAntonio court accepted the legislative find-
ing that a medical malpractice crisis existed. The court also ac-
cepted the legislative hypothesis that the panel system would
substantially reduce the amount of litigation in the subject area
and, thereby, substantially lower the cost of medical malpractice
insurance. The court accepted this hypothesis without'citing any
facts or legislative history which would support their conclusions.
Such deference to the legislative branch of government may no
longer be appropriate. Now that the Virginia panels have operated
for almost ten years, the time has come for the hypothesis to be
tested.
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One measure of effectiveness is whether the panel system re-
solves sufficient medical malpractice cases to warrant the addi-
tional costs imposed upon claimants and providers, and the addi-
tional burden placed on judges, panelists and state employees,
whose time is required to make the process work. Even if the sys-
tem is generally effective in preventing litigation, the time it takes
for resolution of a claim cannot represent an unreasonable delay in
gaining access to the courts-a party has the right to have the
claim or defense decided by a jury. While rhetoric is important in
detecting potential problems, reliable data is needed to determine
whether the Virginia panels deter expensive and unnecessary liti-
gation without infringing upon constitutional rights.
Sensible consideration of these concerns requires the systematic
collection of relevant statistical data. Not only would the informa-
tion allow for knowledgeable and intelligent analyses by the Vir-
ginia General Assembly of the effectiveness of the panel system,
but the data would also provide legislatures of other states and
scholars with general information regarding the success of the Vir-
ginia Medical Malpractice Act during a time when other statutes
with similar goals have failed.
The Bureau of Insurance in the State Corporation Commission
was the designated depository for detailed statistical data to be
furnished by insurers and by attorneys for claimants and provid-
ers.139 Although the Bureau's authority was for the express purpose
of collecting data to review the reasonableness of premium rates,
success in the collection would have helped provide answers about
the efficacy of the panel system. Specifically, one could determine
(1) the percentage of medical malpractice claims disposed of with-
out use of the system, and (2) the percentage of claims that went
on to litigation although the panel had rendered an opinion.140
New legislation providing for the collection of data for a future
determination of the effectiveness of panels is needed. The infor-
mation collected must allow for an analysis of how well panel opin-
139. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-389.3 (Repl. VoL 1981), repealed by 1982 Va. Acts ch. 229.
140. While collection of the necessary data from insurers by the State Corporation Com-
mission with other data to review the reasonableness of insurance premium rates would be
one satisfactory method, there are superior ways. For example, the General Assembly could
provide that a separate medical malpractice docket be maintained in each circuit court and
that certain information be forwarded from this docket at appropriate intervals to a central
office of the state. Whatever is done to provide an adequate database, it does not appear fair
or realistic for claimants' and providers' attorneys to be the source of the information. See
also supra note 14.
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ions predict the outcome of the claim in the event suit is filed. The
systematic and thorough collection of data will avoid the situation
in Florida where the panel system was declared unconstitutional
after a court considered less than eighty cases.14 1 As the dissent in
Aldana noted: "[T]here probably have been thousands of media-
tion cases throughout this state where ... neither the claimants
nor the doctors have been deprived of any constitutional rights.' 14 2
VII. CONCLUSION
The Virginia Medical Malpractice Act has survived a constitu-
tional attack on its facial validity; similar statutes in other states
have not. This survivorship is an indication that Virginia's panel
system is perceived as fostering the goals of speed and cost-con-
tainment in resolving disputes arising out of allegations of medical
malpractice. Some data collected and presented here appear to
support these perceptions.
Statutes similar to Virginia's Medical Malpractice Act, however,
are now being successfully challenged as unconstitutional in their
actual application. The data already collected is not enough to
fully analyze the effectiveness of Virginia's Act in practice. Vir-
ginia's statute may also be unconstitutional in its actual applica-
tion. Hypotheses that panels serve to reduce the number of suits
filed in Virginia, and that panels in operation do not unreasonably
infringe upon access to the courts, can best be tested through addi-
tional data collection, analysis and publication.
ADDENDUM
On March 17, 1985, the Govenor signed House Bill 1434, reen-
acting a requirement of reporting certain medical malpractice
claims.' The Bill substantially tracks subsection A of the repealed
reporting statute.2 Two significant changes are that reports need
only be made annually, and the reports must now include informa-
tion about the specialty of the health care provider. 3 In addition,
141. Aldana v. Holub, 381 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1980).
142. Id. at 239 (Alderman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
1. Va. H. 1434, 1985 Va. Acts. ch. 318 (Approved Mar. 17, 1985)'(to be codifed at VA.
CODE ANN. § 38.1-389.3:1).
2. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-389.3 (Repl. Vol. 1981), repealed by 1981 Va. Acts ch. 229.
3. Compare Va. H. 1434 (reports shall be made annually and shall include the specialty of
each health care provider) with VA. CODE ANN. 38.1-389.3 repealed by 1982 Va. Acts ch. 229
(reports shall be made within 60 days following the final disposition of the case).
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the entity reporting the information, either the health care pro-
vider or the provider's insurer, must provide the Commissioner of
Insurance with "a statistical summary of the information collected
in addition to an individual report on each claim."
'4
4. Va. H. 1434.
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